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Abstract 
As personalisation has dominated the policy agenda for reform in social care, its roll 
out as a mainstream option has coincided with global programmes of austerity which 
have targeted services for disabled people. Was this simply bad timing or was its 
implementation always part of the agenda for reform? Whilst the principle of cash-
for-care schemes drew strongly on promoting the independence and autonomy of 
disabled people, early incarnations of direct payments policy in the UK were initially 
at least in part rolled out in light of potential cost savings to social care budgets. This 
article explores these and other issues in light of evaluations of the Scottish 
Government’s self-directed support test sites (2009-2011) and implementation of 
subsequent legislation enforcing models of self-directed support in Scotland from 
April 2014. Discussion draws on the authors’ recent book (Pearson, Ridley and 
Hunter, 2014) to reflect on what the evidence can tell us about radically transforming 
social care at a time of global austerity. 
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Introduction 
Over the past 20 years, personalisation has emerged as a reforming concept across 
many areas of social policy in the UK (see Fox et al, 2013 for criminal justice; Pykett, 
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2009 for education; Toerien et al, 2013 for employment; Forder and Jones, 2014 for 
health; and Pykett, 2009 for education), gaining what West (2013) identifies as an 
‘ideological grip’ across the public sector. Its appearance in UK systems of social care 
draws in part from the legacy of disability activism culminating in a long fought 
campaign to secure direct payments as a facilitator of independent living (Campbell 
and Oliver, 1996; Morris, 1993), alongside a drive to ‘modernise’ and provide more 
cost efficient and flexible modes of service provision in emerging local care markets 
(Pearson, 2000; Spandler, 2004). Accordingly several commentators observe that 
personalisation has come to stand for a number of competing and contradictory 
demands: perceived as either a radical transformation of social care wherein the 
power balance shifts in favour of service users, or as an attempt to roll back the 
boundaries of the welfare state, to introduce neo-liberal ideals, and undermine public 
sector services and responsibilities (Needham and Glasby, 2014).   
 
Elsewhere European models of personalised social care have emerged with a similar 
diversity in policy discourse, varying from the rights-based scheme of Sweden, to 
more restrictive approaches – for example in Belgium, France and Germany – where 
policy set out specifically to reduce the numbers of persons entering residential care 
(Glasby, 2013). Yet across the UK (Slasberg et al, 2015), Europe (see Hauben et al, 
2012) and North America (Power, 2014), the impact of austerity on personalised 
support in social care has been acute. Despite its roots in the independent living 
movement (Oliver and Sapey, 2006), budget cuts and the broader reconfiguration of 
support for disabled people has acutely undermined these principles. The  impact of 
austerity not only reflects a trend in disability activism, but one that has spread across 
services for other user groups. For example, Roy and Buchanan’s (2015) recent work 
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shows how uncertainty and diminished budgets have greatly reduced investment in 
user activism through recovery services. Consequently, they argue that the parameters 
for providing services with social value, utility and effectiveness – the corner stones 
of independent living - have become far more limited. In recent years, commentators 
such as Taylor-Gooby and Stoker (2011) have positioned the UK programme of 
austerity reforms as part of a broader restructuring of state services with a key goal to 
transfer responsibility from state to the private sector and ultimately to citizens. In 
these terms, others have identified personalisation as the neo-liberal tool to facilitate 
this process across social care (Ferguson, 2007; West, 2013), signifying the end of 
collective services and community based support.  
 
Whilst Scotland has traditionally been slow to embrace the market in social care and 
was largely sceptical of previous policy incarnations of personalised support (see, 
2004), its implementation of new legislation for self-directed support (SDS) 
undoubtedly takes social care into a new era. In this article, we explore the promotion 
of this new era for personalisation in Scotland at a time of austerity. We begin by 
highlighting the challenges of the personalisation agenda in a broader European 
context, as many models of personalised support have also been compromised by 
acute budgetary cuts. Discussion then moves to a commentary on Scotland’s 
positioning of SDS in its early stages of implementation. This provides a more in-
depth focus, by drawing on a series of findings from the evaluations of SDS test sites 
in three local authorities across Scotland (Manthorpe et al, 2011; Ridley et al, 2012; 
2014), information from the roll-out of SDS across Scotland (Scottish Government, 
2013) and data from a Freedom of Information (FOI) request sent out to all 32 
Scottish local authorities in April 2015. This asked authorities to indicate how many 
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users, across different groups, were in receipt of each of the four SDS options. We 
consider whether the early roll out of SDS offered a full range of personalisation 
choices in Scotland. In doing this, we ask whether it is in fact the right plan for reform 
to facilitate independent living, but whose legitimacy has been weakened amidst the 
current spending restraints. Alternatively, was its role in the dismantling of local 
networks of community social care services, loss of community spaces and reducing 
access to personalised support an inevitable consequence of a neo-liberal agenda for 
welfare reform?  
 
Austerity and European challenges to personalised support 
Before looking at changes in Scotland, we turn to briefly to look at how 
personalisation policies have fared across Europe in response to the hostile economic 
climate. As the European Agency for Fundamental Rights warned in 2012, the long-
term impact of austerity changes clearly has serious implications for the well-being of 
a generation of disabled people and would progressively erode the advances that have 
been made in establishing and promoting the rights of disabled people (Hauben et al, 
2012).  In their review of evidence of how austerity measures have impacted on the 
rights and status of disabled people, austerity has undoubtedly emerged as a negative 
influence, with significant differences over its impact on individual disabled people’s 
lives observed across Europe. For example, countries such as Germany, Austria and 
Scandinavia appeared to have endorsed far fewer reductions in social benefits and 
social services, particularly in contrast to Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. Like 
the UK, Hungary has tended to frame austerity measures through a broader 
programme of welfare reform and discourse of modernisation. Yet overall, the pattern 
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indicates a clear focus on the reduction of social services, thereby disproportionately 
impacting on disabled people (Pearson, Ridley and Hunter, 2014). 
 
As we detail later in this article, access to a personalised budget has become 
increasingly restricted as the austerity cuts have taken hold. This is a trend that is also 
being replicated across Europe. Even in member states with well-established 
independent living schemes, key changes have been made which limit disabled 
people’s access to personal assistance. One of the tools used to restrict access has 
been through use of waiting lists. In Ireland, for example, waiting lists for social and 
health care have sharply increased and more than 25 percent of persons with physical 
impairments are waiting for access to assessments for PA and support services 
(Hauben, 2012).  Similarly amongst Belgium’s Flemish community, the PA waiting 
list has increased to 50,000 people – resulting in an estimated 5-10 year wait for this 
type of support (Ratza, 2012). In other countries such as Greece, where there are no 
PB schemes in place, financial support to enable disabled people to live more 
independently has simply been cancelled. Likewise in Portugal, plans to introduce 
PBs from 2011 have been delayed indefinitely (Hauben, 2012). 
 
Austerity, personalisation and a new era for social care in Scotland 
Like many of the examples shown across Europe, for local authorities across the UK, 
rolling out of personalisation and SDS in social care has also coincided with the 
economic crisis. In Scotland, the Social Care (Self Directed Support) Act 2013 was 
implemented from April 2014, just as many of the austerity measures were beginning 
to take force. Leading up to this period, overall Scottish spending was reduced by 
around 11 percent in real terms across a four year period, leaving a 7 percent cut in 
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resources across local authority spending and 37 percent in capital spending (Scottish 
Government, 2012). As social care forms a core service within local authorities, cost 
cutting of local budgets has acute implications for its users. Whilst this had already 
had a significant impact on the planning and delivery of services (Main, 2013), it was 
clear that changes were on-going. Indeed analysis by the Scottish Government 
indicated that the worst of the cuts were yet to emerge – with the full impact of 
changes expected in 2016 (Scottish Government, 2014). Furthermore, the election of 
a majority Conservative Government in May 2015 with a commitment to cut welfare 
spending by a further £12 billion signified a longer term decline for funding in these 
service areas (Watt, 2015). As we show in this article, front line social care workers in 
Scotland have continually expressed strong concerns about the current and future 
impact of austerity measures in adopting SDS. In order to examine these issues in 
more detail, we draw on findings from evaluative studies of SDS as the basis of a 
critical commentary on the positioning of policy in the early stages on implementation. 
The following section details the background and methodology to this work. 
 
Background to the test sites and methodology 
In 2009, as government cuts on social welfare spending were starting to impact, the 
Scottish Government, Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) and the 
Association of Directors of Social Work (ADSW) selected three local authorities to 
design and test out the systems needed to implement SDS in social care.  The test sites 
were selected to represent a broad geographical spread including one remote rural site, 
and local authority performance based on Social Work Inspection Agency inspections.  
Each test site was given up to £1.2 million for just over two years (January 2009 to 31 
March 2011) to put in place systems that would facilitate a shift towards SDS.  At the 
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outset, the Scottish Government wanted the test sites to focus on three themes 
identified from research evidence as critical to enable this transformation: these were 
the need to reduce bureaucracy or ‘red tape’; the importance of leadership and 
training; and the need for bridging finance to double fund existing services while 
introducing more individualised models of support.  
 
The evaluative studies that we draw upon for this article, used a mixed methods 
approach involving several elements.  The first evaluation comprised a review of the 
literature on facilitators and barriers to SDS (Ridley et al 2011); gathered and collated 
quantitative information about those receiving SDS packages; conducted secondary 
analysis of national statistical data (Scottish Government, 2011); carried out 
interviews with national and local stakeholders; held action learning sets involving 
key stakeholders from each area; monitored test sites’ implementation plans; and 
focused on 30 individual service users’ and carers’ experiences to better understand 
these new SDS systems from service users’, family carers’, and front-line workers’ 
perspectives. 
A follow-up evaluative study involved interviews with key stakeholders, a 
questionnaire survey of frontline staff and gathered systematic monitoring 
information to provide an update on developments in terms of the processes, practice, 
outputs and outcomes of SDS in the former test site areas (Ridley et al, 2012). The 
views of over sixty different stakeholders from the three areas were analysed 
including service user organisations, advocacy services and voluntary sector providers.  
Over 500 frontline staff in adult social care across the three areas were surveyed via 
an online questionnaire (with a response rate of 43 per cent). This article draws in 
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particular upon the findings from this survey to reflect upon frontline workers’ 
experience and perceptions of the impact of budget cuts on SDS implementation.  
In order to provide an updated snapshot of SDS implementation in Scotland, we also 
carried out a FOI request across the 32 local authorities in April 2015. Authorities 
were asked the question: what are the total numbers of users currently receiving SDS 
for each of the four options? At the time of writing, 29 local authorities had replied. 
Twenty six of these offered full information on the questions asked, three only 
included partial data and two local authorities declined the request on grounds of cost. 
The implications of these findings are discussed later in this article.   
Ethical and research governance approvals were received for the research from 
[Authors’ University ethics committee] as well as from the ADSW and the three local 
authorities.  
 
In this article, we consider findings across these studies alongside a FOI request to 
explore how the timing of the austerity cuts has impacted on the implementation of 
SDS. This is discussed through four key issues. Firstly, by looking at the shift away 
from direct payments to SDS, we consider how grassroots disability activism and its 
considerable influence in the development of direct payments became diluted under 
the infiltration of neo-liberalism and the personalisation of social care. Secondly 
discussion moves to examine these ideas more specifically in the Scottish context by 
looking at how personalisation has been adopted through new legislation and what we 
define as an ‘evolving concept of SDS’. Thirdly we return to issues relating to the 
discourse of cost efficiency associated first, with direct payments and then with the 
broader personalisation agenda. This has clearly been a significant theme in the 
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adoption of personalisation policies across the UK – particularly when comparing to 
other countries such as Norway. Indeed, we show how findings from the test sites 
offer some evidence to support this contention, whereby in some areas, SDS has been 
used as a mechanism to cut support packages. This links into the final area, a focus on 
the limitations and problems of the resource allocation system (RAS).  
 
From DPs to SDS 
As has been documented extensively elsewhere (e.g. Campbell and Oliver, 1996; 
Glasby and Littlechild, 2009) the idea of cash-for-care as an alternative to directly 
provided services originated in the 1970s in the US (Arksey and Kemp, 2008). This 
saw a small group of students with physical impairments at the University of Berkeley 
secure payment of cash in place of services to buy-in support which fitted their daily 
needs. Gradually news of this spread throughout the US and by the 1980s, similar 
challenges were being made by groups of disabled people in the UK. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s indirect payments – those administered through third parties such as 
voluntary organisations – were used to overcome legal restrictions to a cash-based 
model of support across the UK. In line with actions a few years earlier in the US, the 
roles of small groups of disabled people were central to changes during this time. 
They demanded a more flexible alternative to rigid and paternalistic modes of service 
provision offered to them by local authorities. In Scotland, although developments 
were more limited, pockets of activism also emerged during the 1980s, notably in the 
former Lothian region. At this time, Lothian Regional Council permitted three 
indirect payments to be made. While this was initially approved, problems arose when, 
in 1995, the then Department of Social Security was alerted to this practice and 
suspended all the payments of those involved. A challenge to the case in Lothian was 
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made and won by the local authority, but the case had raised the profile and potential 
of cash payments to increase disabled people’s choice and control over their social 
care, thereby instigating the need for a formal legislative path to be developed 
(Pearson, 2004).  Disability activism therefore undoubtedly played an important role 
in moving towards legislation for direct payments in the late 1990s, although as we 
discuss shortly, a discourse of efficiency always prevailed. 
 
Whilst many welcomed the shift to direct payments, change was not uniformly 
embraced with strong resistance emerging in many parts of the UK. In particular, the 
number of users in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were especially low (Riddell 
et al, 2005) when compared with key local authorities in the south of England such as 
Hampshire and Essex.  From 1997-2003, various attempts were made by the then 
Scottish Executive and Westminster Governments to reignite policy but uptake was 
never more than marginal (Priestley et al, 2010). 
 
Under the Labour Government (1997-2010) many of the themes which linked direct 
payments to the Conservative’s broader agenda of marketisation were developed 
through a focus on the personalisation of social care services (Pearson, Ridley and 
Hunter, 2014). At this stage, ideas promoted by Leadbeater (2004; 2008) exploring 
how services could be modernised through the direct participation of users in service 
delivery, had a profound influence on reforming the adult social care system. 
Leadbeater et al (2008: 47) argued strongly in favour of a model of consumerism 
which encouraged users to take on the role of a budget holder, but at the same time 
embracing themes of citizenship and related notions of rights and entitlements. 
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Although widely popular amongst Westminster government circles from the mid-
2000s, caution was expressed from a number of quarters.  
 
For many, the promotion of consumerist identities sat uncomfortably with the 
experiences and identities of many people who use social care and mental health 
services (Carr, 2011; Morris, 2004). Others such as Ferguson (2012) and Dodd (2013) 
argue that the social justice values associated with personalisation policies and which 
were so strongly promoted by the disability movement, have been subsumed by neo-
liberalism.  Therefore rather than extend individual autonomy, Ferguson warned that 
such policies would be used by cash strapped local authorities to make savings from 
their services. As we discuss shortly, it is clear that this neo-liberal discourse has 
remained dominant in the roll-out of personalisation and is an unhelpful legacy for its 
implementation (Pearson, Ridley and Hunter, 2014).   
 
In Scotland the shift to a more personalised system of social care has been slower and 
more complex (Kettle, 2011). As stated, this undoubtedly reflected a less enthusiastic 
drive towards the marketization of social care than south of the border and a 
reluctance in many areas to fully embrace direct payments (Pearson, 2004). As policy 
emerged, the Scottish Government employed the term Self Directed Support (SDS) to 
develop distinctive policy goals (Pearson, Ridley and Hunter, 2014) setting out SDS 
to be part of its aspirations to create a ‘healthier nation with stronger and safer 
communities’ (Scottish Government, 2007: 2). 
 
It is clear from the history of direct payments, personalisation, individual budgets, 
SDS and other cash-for-care based schemes in social care that terms can be used 
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interchangeably and are confusing (Pearson, Ridley and Hunter, 2014). Notably direct 
payments and personal budgets have often been set out as being essentially the same 
thing – in that they both involve a cash alternative to directly provided services. 
However as Beresford (2009) notes, there are important differences in their 
underpinning ideologies. As discussed earlier, direct payments were a grassroots 
development emerging from the disabled people’s movement and a desire to equalize 
opportunities and increase independent living (see Glasby and Littlechild, 2009), 
whilst personal budgets evolved from developments largely driven by professionals 
critical of the welfare state and its ability to promote independent living. Direct 
Payments are based on a social model of disability and the philosophy of independent 
living, whereas ‘personalisation’ emerged from the vision of welfare reformers such 
as In Control – pioneers of SDS and Individual Budgets in 2003 - as an approach to 
enable disabled people to direct and take charge of their support and which has since 
underpinned UK-wide policies promoting personalisation (Pearson, Ridley and 
Hunter, 2014). The following section explores this in relation to the development of 
SDS in Scotland. 
 
SDS – an evolving concept 
 
The Care and Support (Self-directed Support) (Scotland) Act 2013 (the SDS Act) 
offered four different options for SDS. These included option 1, a direct payment 
approach; option 2, a selection of support by the user but arranged through the local 
authority or other agency on their behalf; option 3, support organised and provided by 
the local authority; or option 4, a mixture of these options (Scottish Government, 
2014). Critically, support for SDS from the governing Scottish National Party brought 
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policy into the mainstream of social care provision and thereby increased the numbers 
of people directing their own support from the time of implementation in April 2014. 
Unlike previous policy incarnations, the focus on direct payments as only one variant 
of the SDS approach has caused some confusion with SDS  becoming an ‘evolving’ 
or ‘elastic’ concept, which has been variously defined and implemented much as has 
personalisation  (Manthorpe et al, 2011; Larsen et al, 2013). As discussion moves to 
look at some of the broader policy discourses, we will re-visit this theme later in the 
article. 
 
Commentators identify a perceptible shift in the rhetoric around personalisation, 
moving from a primary focus on individual control over budgets, to an emphasis on 
the importance of offering ‘choice and control’ and focusing on individual outcomes 
(Beresford, 2009). The experience of the test sites indicates a similar evolution of the 
concept of SDS in Scotland. Early on, the stated purpose of the test sites had been to 
increase the number and range of people receiving direct payments:  
 
“The very baseline is Manifesto commitments, each of the test sites must 
demonstrate increase in take-up of direct payments as an absolute …” 
(Interview with national policy makers in 2010 quoted in Pearson, Ridley and 
Hunter, 2014: 31-32).  
 
In contrast, local and national stakeholders insisted that SDS was a broader concept 
implementing ‘personalised services’, and that it consisted of a spectrum of options 
that included direct payments at one end and local authority-provided services at the 
other.  This broader definition of SDS was also in evidence in the National Strategy 
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for SDS (Scottish Government, 2010), as well as in the subsequent SDS Act. 
Furthermore, the range of support packages evidenced during, and a year after the test 
sites, reflected this. Initially at least, direct payments (option 1) was the most common 
SDS option (Manthorpe et al, 2011), while at the follow up evaluation, the majority of 
SDS packages were arranged and managed by local authorities (option 3) (Ridley et 
al, 2012): a pattern mirroring the experience of Personal Budgets in England, the 
majority of which were taken in the form of local authority managed budgets 
(ADASS, 2011; Beresford, 2013; Slasberg et al., 2013). Indeed, by the time of our 
FOI request in April 2015, 73 percent of the local authorities who responded (n=26) 
indicated that option 3 – support organised and provided by the local authority - was 
the most commonly used form of SDS. In only one local authority did direct payment 
recipients  (option 1) outnumber those in option 3.   
 
A discourse of cost efficiency 
Since legislation implementing direct payments in the late 1990s, and the promotion 
of personalisation by Leadbeater et al (2008), a discourse of cost efficiency has been a 
major feature of policy promotion across the UK. Even before this time, the 
successive dismissals of direct payment legislation on the statute throughout the 
1990s were only brought to an end when the British Council of Disabled People 
commissioned research, which in promoting the merits of direct payments also 
showed them to be up to 40 percent cheaper than directly provided services (Zarb and 
Nadash, 1994). Whilst this has never been realized in practice, the link between 
personalisation and cost efficiency has remained a dominant theme in the UK. 
Leadbeater et al (2008) and others (see Duffy, 2010; Needham, 2011a; 2011b) have 
highlighted the link, suggesting that savings could even be as high as 45 percent. This 
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despite the national Individual Budget (IBSEN) study (Glendinning et al, 2008) 
finding an 11 percent increase in infrastructure costs thus contradicting the claim that 
the process could increase value for money.  
 
It is therefore clear that the focus on budgets and empowerment through cash-for-care 
has been a key feature of personalisation in the UK. This is reiterated by Christensen 
and Pilling (2014) who examined the differences between personalisation policies 
implemented in social democratic welfare regimes and those in more neo-liberal 
contexts. In looking at this issue, they provide a comparative analysis of Norway and 
England and argued that whilst both ran systems that had been supported by active 
disability movements and promoted market based models for social care provision, 
the main difference lies in their promotion of care markets and the focus on consumer 
roles. In England a key policy emphasis has been to give users knowledge of the 
amount they have to spend (indicative budget) on their support upfront and to have 
choice and control on how this is spent (Glasby and Duffy, 2007).   
 
Thus the speed at which IBs have been implemented in the UK was, as Carr (2013) 
has observed, made on the basis of scant evidence.  In Scotland, the results of a small-
scale IB demonstration project in North Lanarkshire were positive about the benefits 
and the potential of the In Control approach (Etherington et al., 2009), and this was 
followed by test sites adopting a similar approach in 2009 (Manthorpe et al 2011). 
The nexus of control promoted at the heart of the personalisation strategy in England 
has often been presented as entirely positive and that if people have choice and 
control simply by virtue of knowing the allocated budget, its actual size is 
unimportant. As Slasberg et al (2012, 2013, 2015) observe however, this fails to 
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acknowledge that positive results were associated with PBs being taken as direct 
payments, and further that those receiving local authority managed services did not 
experience the same positive outcomes. Furthermore, better individual outcomes have 
been found for those using a direct payment to employ PAs and have enough resource 
to meet social and leisure needs (Slasberg et al, 2015).  By contrast, Norway’s focus 
has been on the control (or what Christensen and Pilling (2014) term ‘citizen 
choices’) they have over the actual support received, that is, the role of managing 
their support workers.   
 
The experience of the test sites offers a different insight regarding upfront allocations. 
While not disputing that a resource allocation in the form of an IB should be 
transparent, the Dumfries & Galloway test site concluded that such transparency 
sometimes resulted in inferior solutions as it shifted the focus to the budget 
entitlement instead of on the outcomes sought. Instead, they concluded that prior to 
introducing a budget figure, identifying and working with natural support networks 
led to the development of more creative solutions based on individuals’ assets and 
community resources: 
 
“The In Control 7-steps didn’t work for us. It was the money upfront bit. 
What we learnt from the test site was that if you tell people what the 
money is you get a plan that is that to the penny. We did a few where we 
didn’t say what the indicative budget was and quite a few came in at less 
and they were more outcomes focused. Giving the figure upfront we found 
was skewing people’s thinking, and the plans were not quite as creative” 
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(Local authority implementation staff, quoted in Pearson, Ridley and 
Hunter, 2014: 35). 
 
As other research has shown (Hatton and Waters, 2013), user and carer satisfaction 
with SDS has been linked  with agreement about the panel’s decision on the size of 
the IB in relation to what they identified was needed (Manthorpe et al, 2011). User 
and carer dissatisfaction in the test sites was commonly associated with there being 
some discrepancy between what they perceived as their needs and the final financial 
allocation decided by the local authority, as well as with differences between users, 
carers and professionals in their perceptions of need. Some users felt they had been 
encouraged to have ‘false expectations’ as one disabled man in his 70s demonstrates: 
 
“They (social workers) took everything into consideration that we 
were telling them and they wrote it down and then they checked it 
against what we had written down, the form we had filled in, and they 
seemed quite in agreement with what we needed and what we had self-
assessed and then as I say it went away and sat in front of this Board 
(panel) for a year and when we got word back, everything had been 
cut, we only needed so many hours and ... in the morning and so many 
hours at night for getting ready for bed and whatever...” (Quoted in 
Manthorpe et al, 2011: 57) 
 
Frontline workers from the Glasgow test site in particular linked SDS with making 
cuts in social care budgets, identifying negative impacts on service users’ choice and 
control.  Personalisation they said, was a ‘means to cut services’, a ‘guise to reduce 
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budgets’, and the process was overtly ‘budget orientated’ rather than driven by an 
ethos of independent living. The direct impact of cuts on social care and the inability 
then to implement SDS in the way intended, was a common theme, even though many 
typically prefaced their comments with ‘personalisation is a good idea but…’.  Some 
highlighted increased stress for service users and carers with many experiencing a 
reduction in traditional packages of care when they were moved onto SDS, which 
impacted negatively on their quality of life.  The majority of frontline respondents 
made this clear link:  
 
“The SDS process is being used as a mechanism for managing budgets. 
However this is in relation to the overall financial climate and the cuts would 
have been required regardless of the implementation of SDS…Support 
packages tend to only deal with basic need and no longer take into 
consideration quality of life and in some cases the panel does not account for 
carers’ stress within the support package”.  (Frontline worker responding to 
the online survey, 2012) 
 
It is likely that such dissatisfaction with SDS budgets will continue to increase in the 
future, given the financial constraints that local authorities will increasingly face (see 
Scottish Government, 2014). 
 
Limitations of Resource Allocation Systems (RAS)  
One of the most controversial elements of the personalisation programme in social 
care has been the system for allocating resources or Resource Allocation System 
(RAS) (Slasberg et al, 2012; Series, 2014). The RAS is defined as ‘a set of rules that 
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can be used to calculate an individual budget’ (Duffy, 2010: 206).  It has therefore 
been central in how local authorities make decisions about individual packages. Yet 
growing evidence suggests that RAS are operating in ways that were not anticipated 
by those who promoted them (Series, 2014).  Indicating the strength of feeling evoked 
by RAS, a user led organization consulted during the test sites evaluation observed 
“we [disabled people’s movement] fought for SDS and personalisation but not for the 
RAS” (Pearson, Ridley and Hunter, 2014, 36). All three test sites struggled with 
setting up RAS under the In Control model, and had not resolved these issues one 
year on. A major limitation to RAS was found in applying across client groups: 
 
“Getting the resource allocation right is an art not a system — it needs to 
be flexible. Slotting people into boxes is not going to work. At the end of 
the test site and now there is still a need to develop an equitable way of 
distributing and managing resources. We know what we have is not quite 
right but we haven’t solved this issue yet”. (Local authority 
implementation staff,  Pearson, Ridley and Hunter, 2014: 59) 
 
Dissatisfaction with RAS has tended to centre around increased bureaucracy and 
questions have been raised as to what constitutes a ‘fair allocation’ (Slasberg et al, 
2013). As West (2013) found in her study of personalisation in an English authority, 
amid austerity cuts of around 30 percent, resource restrictions meant that for many, 
the very possibility of obtaining a PB was denied. Yet rather than address these issues 
directly, the Council moved forward with the scheme and presented it as part of a 
‘transformation strategy’ which would help widen the social care market and drive 
out perceived inefficiencies in service provision. West’s work highlighted how 
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populations of social care users have been left outside new systems of personalised 
support by reframing the boundaries of eligibility. In Scotland similar patterns are 
beginning to emerge. For example in Glasgow, the initial development of SDS 
coincided with an 11 percent cut from the £89 million social care budget during 
2012/13 (Main, 2013). In explaining the cuts, the local authority have presented 
personalisation as a strategy for services to be delivered more efficiently. It will be 
interesting whether defining eligibility determination using national eligibility criteria 
as under the Care Act 2014 in England, will alter this picture south of the border 
(Care and Support (Eligibility) Regulations 2014). 
 
Research finds a major discrepancy overall between indicative and final budget 
figures agreed by RAS panels (Series and Clements, 2013: Slasberg et al., 2013).  
This was borne out to some degree by the experience of the Scottish test sites, though 
our data is derived from small participant numbers and is not strictly comparative 
with these other studies. Nonetheless, our data indicates the emergence of similar 
concerns in Scotland, with only a minority of frontline workers suggesting that 
outcomes from SDS were more positive:  
 
“We are clearly advised to work towards less rather than more and we know 
before we discuss cases that the budget needs to come in less than the 
estimated budget and definitely less than existing service provision unless 
there is compelling reasons to argue differently…”(Frontline worker 
responding to online survey, 2012).  
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One year on from the test sites, frontline workers from Glasgow commented that final 
budget levels were invariably lower than those proposed, and that service users were 
experiencing cuts in support.  Around three out of five agreed that SDS budgets were 
insufficient to meet needs, which was similar to the findings of the UK-wide 
Community Care and Unison PB survey (2011), showing 48 percent of social work 
practitioners assessing PBs as insufficient to meet service users’ needs.  Whilst the 
strength of feeling linking SDS with cuts was less pronounced in two of the test sites, 
frontline workers in Highland expressed disquiet that budget constraints made it 
difficult to get funding approval for more ‘aspirational’ rather than ‘critical’ needs, 
indicating a shift in the operation of eligibility criteria. Such findings strike as ironic 
given personalisation was initially promoted as ‘aspirational’ (Needham, 2011). 
 
Discussion and conclusions  
As Scotland has moved to implement SDS as the mainstream framework for social 
care, this article has raised a number of concerns relating to the timing and 
underpinning discourses influencing this shift. Findings from SDS test sites in 
Scotland and more recent figures on SDS take up from local authorities indicate that 
SDS has moved away from direct payments to a focus on support which is organised 
and managed by the local authority. At best, those who have entered the SDS system 
in Scotland may have experienced greater involvement in the discussion about their 
needs and support packages. However, as test site results show, there is also evidence 
that reassessment through a new SDS process falls short of co-production and may at 
worst, amount to reduced support packages. Those implementing SDS continue to 
face a number of thorny issues not least with systems of allocating resources which 
tend to become heavily bureaucratized and act as mechanisms for delivering cuts 
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(Beresford, 2013).  As Stack (2013) observes, the reality of RAS is ‘more opaque’ 
than intended.  The root of the problem may however lie more fundamentally as 
Slasberg et al (2013) argue in what is meant by ‘fair allocation’.   
 
Furthermore, as Hall (2011) argues, the new ‘care market place’ for personalisation 
has both transformed existing relations of care and constrained collective and 
interdependent forms of care that many people value resulting in a ‘lack of fit’ 
between the needs of different groups of disabled people and personalised care 
provision. As local authorities devolve their budgets to the individual, collective 
forms of support will inevitably receive less resourcing (Needham, 2013). The 
implications of more privatized experiences of social care support and reduced 
opportunity for social interaction linking with broader critiques of neoliberalism 
across the social sciences (Dodd, 2013; Verhaeghe, 2014). As Monbiot (2014) 
suggests, ‘the market was meant to emancipate us, offering autonomy and freedom. 
Instead it has delivered atomization and loneliness’.  
 
Whilst the cuts from local authority budgets have undoubtedly impacted on the roll-
out of SDS, the establishment of the Scottish Independent Living Fund (SILF) in July 
2015 – with a £5.5 million investment from the Scottish Government to continue with 
existing payments - represents an important departure from policy in England and 
Wales (Northern Ireland is also covered by the SILF). Since its inception in the mid-
1990s, the Independent Living Fund (ILF) allowed an alternative route to cash 
payments for disabled people with the highest support needs, as funds were paid via a 
charity and funded through central government rather than local authorities. It proved 
highly popular with its users and played an important role in the evolution of 
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personalised support (Morris, 2004). However the UK Coalition Government (2010-
2015) set in place a decision to close the ILF in July 2015 and transfer monies to local 
authorities in England and Wales without a requirement for them to be ring-fenced. A 
move that has been widely criticized and raised questions about how already cash 
strapped authorities would cover the fund’s costs and enable its users to sustain the 
same levels of independence (White, 2013). The contrast in responses to dealing with 
the future of the ILF north and south of the border are therefore important when 
looking at the broader personalisation agenda as each have very different implications 
for the goals of autonomy, citizenship and control. 
 
Despite growing critiques of personalisation, Beresford (2014) argues that innovative 
grassroots developments have much to offer. Notably, initiatives such as those led by 
The Standards We Expect consortium (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2011) have set 
out a vision for person-centred support and developing ‘bottom-up’ ways of 
challenging barriers to this. Although highlighting the difficulties in achieving 
personalised outcomes in a hostile economic climate, these commentators also argue 
that the funding shortfall is intrinsically linked to the continued existence of a social 
care culture that remains at odds with person-centred support and the principle of self-
determination. The solution, argue Slasberg and Beresford (2015), lies in learning the 
‘right lessons’ from the implementation of personalisation so far, moving from 
consumerist notions of individual control and a preoccupation with PBs, to refocusing 
on truly personalised support plans built from accurate assessment of needs, 
sufficiency of resource and flexibility of provision. 
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In Scotland, examples of positive practice in SDS are emerging.  Research funded by 
Glasgow Disability Alliance (Witcher, 2014) was set up by a user-led organisation to 
explore options for disabled people to enable increased choice and control in their 
day-to-day lives. The project focused on the core requirements of facilitating 
individual choice and independent living and found there was no obvious or 
consistent relationship between the amount of money that was spent on realizing 
individual choices and the scale of its impact. For example, some packages involved 
considerable investment for a British Sign Language interpreter to be available, 
whereas others required only a few hundred pounds for transport costs so that the 
individual could attend classes of their choice. Similarly, the test sites found no 
correlation between the size of the support package and the impact of SDS on 
individuals’ and families’ lives (Manthorpe et al,  2011). As Witcher (2014), along 
with Slasberg and Beresford (2015) argue, the success of SDS is in support that is 
truly person-centred and is clearly linked to self-defined outcomes. As such, the 
message of increased and more meaningful user-control from this type of initiative, 
underlines how control – or in the Norwegian concept of ‘citizen choices’ 
(Christensen and Pilling, 2014) should be a more central preoccupation in the 
implementation of SDS.  
 
This links in with broader critiques by Beresford (2014) who argues that in England, 
commissioning authorities must ensure that the price paid in the ‘care market’ for 
services is enough to provide a personalised approach. In doing this, he emphasized 
the need for local areas to develop a network of providers who are able to deliver 
flexible and responsive services and not simply block contracts. Although the 
marketization of social care is arguably at a more advanced stage in England, 
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Scotland still has lessons to learn and securing a key role for user-led organisations 
would be an important way forward. In Norway, users are increasingly choosing a 
user-led organisation ‘Uloba’ as their service provider for personal assistance. As 
Christensen and Pilling (2014) show, these users are found to be significantly more 
satisfied with this model of support, than those who have chosen the municipality as 
the employer. However the promotion of this type of user-led model across the UK 
raises a note of caution in light of the wider challenges to sustaining activism as part 
of service provision and policy development amid long-term cuts to budgets. For Roy 
and Buchanan (2015), the climate of insecurity and uncertainty emanating from 
austerity has the potential to erode solidarity and trust, with the threat of 
unemployment making opportunities for service commissioners and providers to 
develop activism particularly difficult. Evidence from the initiatives documented by 
Beresford and Witcher above, as well as Roy and Buchanan’s own observations in 
recovery services show that this more negative outcome is not inevitable, but the 
austerity environment is undoubtedly more hostile to this vital support infrastructure.    
 
In conclusion, at one level SDS is an uncomplicated idea that is impossible to 
disagree with, but as the experience of implementing SDS policy in Scotland has 
shown, there are ongoing challenges that need to be faced.  To implement SDS in any 
meaningful way, requires a major paradigm shift in the relationship between users and 
professionals, and a refocus on the importance of the ethos of independent living.  
Further, the will to promote user centred practice and to embrace transformational 
change cannot be progressed in isolation from the austerity drive that is evident across 
Europe.   
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